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Dawkins: Enigma of Housing Choice

THE ENIGMA OF HOUSING CHOICE
Casey J. Dawkins*
ABSTRACT
The U.S. faces a housing choice crisis. The growing shortage of affordable
rental homes and looming mismatch between the homes offered for sale by baby
boomers and the homes sought by the next generation of homeowners point to a
need to fundamentally reshape the extent and diversity of the nation’s housing
options. Housing and land-use policy experts have appealed to the aim of expanding
housing choice to justify the removal of regulatory restrictions on certain housing
types, the construction of affordable rental housing in transit-adjacent
neighborhoods, the elimination of housing market discrimination on the basis of
race and ethnicity, and the expansion of tenant-based rental vouchers in lowpoverty neighborhoods.
Housing choice expansion is a battle being waged on multiple fronts in
defense of a variety of causes, but conceptual confusion threatens to erode the
foundation of this fragile alliance. This paper brings clarity to the cause by
exploring the concept of housing choice, evaluating the normative arguments in
favor of expanding housing choice, and proposing a refined conception of the goal
to expand housing choice. I defend a conception of housing choice expansion that
prioritizes effective housing choice and tenure and type neutrality. This conception
provides a justification for several policy reforms, including an expanded demandside housing subsidy funded by eliminating homeownership tax incentives,
enhancements to renters’ rights of occupancy, expansion of flexible tenure
arrangements, and reform of local land-use practices.
INTRODUCTION
U.S. housing policy advocates and scholars have recently called attention
to the nation’s growing shortage of affordable homes and failure of housing markets
to adequately meet the needs of housing consumers. New housing construction has
barely kept pace with household growth in the wake of the 2007 mortgage crisis.
Since 2011, the number of affordably priced rental homes has declined by four
million units, producing a net shortage of seven million rental units that are
affordable to extremely low-income households (Joint Center for Housing Studies
of Harvard University 2019; Aurand et al. 2020; Dawkins 2021). Arthur C. Nelson,
*
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the inspiration for this Festschrift issue of the Journal of Comparative Urban Law
and Policy, has devoted his career to reshaping the nation’s built environment to
adequately house future generations. In his projections of future housing demand
to the year 2040, Nelson (2020) shows that to adequately house the growing and
diversifying U.S. population, the nation’s housing stock will need to be
significantly retooled to house an additional 26 million households seeking to
downsize to smaller homes between 2010 and 2040.
In response to these trends, housing and land-use policy experts call
attention to the need to “expand housing choice.” For example, the Smart Growth
Network, a partnership between the Environmental Protection Agency and various
public and private organizations, cites the goal of creating a “range of housing
opportunities and choices” among its list of ten smart growth principles (Smart
Growth Network 2015). For smart growth advocates, expanding housing choice
means encouraging the construction of attached and multifamily housing units in
areas well-served by urban infrastructure. Others understand the expansion of
housing choice in terms of the enhancement of opportunities to live in racially and
ethnically integrated neighborhoods. Xavier Briggs (2005, 331), a proponent of this
view, asserts that “expanding housing choice is a linchpin for any agenda to ensure
equal opportunity and reduce inequality in a more and more diverse society.”
Edward Goetz (2015, 839) calls upon housing policymakers to commit to “the
pursuit of greater choice for people of color and people of limited means” but
argues that this aspatial goal should take priority over the goal of trying to promote
residential integration. These examples suggest that not only do housing and landuse policy experts not agree on what expanded housing choice means, but they also
appeal to different normative frameworks to tackle the moral quandary of why
expanded housing choice matters.
This paper explores the concept of housing choice, evaluates the normative
arguments in favor of expanding housing choice, and proposes a refined conception
of the goal to expand housing choice. I conclude that the goal of expanding housing
choice is ambiguous without further elaboration. The goal can be interpreted in
terms of many different dimensions of housing choice, and the moral arguments in
favor of choice expansion often conflict with one another. I present the case for a
conception of housing choice expansion that prioritizes effective housing choice
and tenure and type neutrality and explore policy reforms that are consistent with
this conception.
THE DIMENSIONS OF HOUSING CHOICE
To understand the myriad interpretations of housing choice expansion, it is
useful to begin with an examination of a simple model of housing choice. Richard
Muth’s (1969) monocentric model of intraurban location provides a stylized
framework that helps to illustrate the various dimensions of housing choice:
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Max U(X, H(z)) s.t. Y = PxX + PhH(z), T = e(d) + td
In this equation, households maximize utility (U) – where utility is a
function that expresses the well-being that households receive from the
consumption of housing (H(z)) and other goods (X) – by choosing a residential
location that is a given distance (d) from the central business district. The household
faces a household budget constraint (Y = P xX + PhH(z)) and a time constraint (T =
e(d) + td). The budget constraint says that all income (Y) is spent on housing (H(z))
and other goods (X), at prices of P h for housing and Px for other goods. The time
constraint says that all time is consumed by leisure (e(d)) and commuting, which is
equal to the time cost of travel (t) times distance (d) to the central business district.
Housing is a multidimensional good that is represented in terms of a vector of
attributes (z) that include structure types, local amenities and public goods, and
distance to the central business district.
This simple housing choice problem illustrates that policymakers can
influence the extent of housing choice in a variety of ways. Policies that increase Y
or reduce Ph expand housing choice by expanding the capacity of households to
rent or purchase the homes that they prefer. Among housing policymakers, there is
some debate over the question of whether affordable housing policy should focus
narrowly on assisting those earning the lowest incomes versus expanding
affordability for a broad range of households. Smart growth policy advocates tend
to side with those who call for this broader emphasis, as reflected in the Smart
Growth Network’s (2015) goal to provide “quality housing for people of all income
levels.”
The goal of expanding housing choice is also a goal of land-use policy
reformers who seek to adjust zoning and subdivision regulations to shape the
characteristics of the housing stock (the elements of the vector z). Smart growth
advocates often call for policy reforms that promote multifamily living
arrangements, attached dwelling units, high-density apartments, and accessory
dwelling units. This policy priority stems from smart growth advocates’ desire to
offer alternatives to the suburban large-lot single-family detached homes that have
dominated the U.S. residential landscape since World War II (Duany, PlaterZyberk, and Speck 2010).
In Muth’s (1969) monocentric model of housing choice, the geography of
residential location choice is represented by the household’s chosen distance (d)
from the central business district. In equilibrium, the savings in housing costs from
moving one mile away from the central business district are exactly offset by an
increase in commuting costs. This produces a particular spatial pattern where
housing prices decline with distance from the central business district.
Transportation infrastructure investments that reduce commuting costs citywide
lead to an outward expansion of the city because households are willing to pay more
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to live in distant locations. Land-use policies may disrupt these outcomes by
altering the supply of land available for the construction of different housing types
at different distances from the central business district (Nelson 1986).
Affordable housing policies targeted to particular geographic areas may
also shape the geography of housing choice. For example, the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development’s Moving to Opportunity demonstration
initiative expanded the number of tenant-based rental subsidies awarded to lowincome households in selected cities, but these subsides could only be used to rent
housing in low-poverty neighborhoods (Goering and Feins 2003). Similarly, the
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit housing production subsidy includes a variety of
federal tax incentives that overlap with state incentives to shape the geographic
pattern of low-income housing production (Dawkins 2013). Many debates around
housing choice address the question of where housing choices should be expanded
and how regulatory and subsidy policies should be designed to shape the geography
of housing choice.
THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF HOUSING CHOICE
As revealed by the discussion in the previous section, the aim of expanding
housing choice has many possible interpretations, depending on which elements of
the housing choice set policymakers seek to expand and which policy levers are
pushed. Regardless of whether housing choice is understood in terms of housing
affordability, housing type, or housing in particular locations, arguments justifying
the expansion of housing choice often appeal, implicitly or explicitly, to a variety
of different normative arguments about the proper role of government vis-à-vis
private choices. These arguments, in turn, point to different distributional ideals of
housing choices and housing choice attributes. This section compares and contrasts
seven different moral frameworks that underlie the different interpretations of
housing choice expansion espoused by housing and land-use practitioners.
Utilitarian Choice
The housing choice model sketched in the previous section forms the basis
for the standard utilitarian model of housing choice. The limitations of this model
provide points of departure for the remaining housing choice frameworks examined
in the remainder of this section. According to the utilitarian framework, the value
of a choice lies in its beneficial consequences for an individual’s well-being, and
the goal of policy should be to maximize the sum of these beneficial consequences
across the population. In equilibrium, households’ marginal rate of substitution
between housing and other goods is equal to the ratio of the housing unit’s price to
the price of other goods. The law of diminishing marginal utility implies that a more
equal distribution of housing is more likely to maximize aggregate utility than a
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highly unequal distribution, but equality of choice has no intrinsic value other than
as a means to maximize utility (Dawkins 2021).
One important limitation of utilitarianism is that it licenses morally
objectionable tradeoffs to increase aggregate utility. If aggregate utility reaches its
maximum only when some go homeless, the utilitarian has no complaint with this
outcome. When exercising housing choice, households also incur considerable
costs that are often ignored by the standard utilitarian model of household choice.
Moving is time-consuming and costly, and home purchases require expensive home
inspections, appraisals, and legal expertise. Homebuyers must also spend time
evaluating mortgage financing options. If these costs are large enough, some
potentially beneficial housing options will remain unchosen and some pareto
efficient exchanges will go unrealized (Dawkins 2021). Another implication of
moving and transaction costs is that households become more likely to adjust
housing consumption only when faced with large, unavoidable changes in
household circumstances.
Many have proposed modified versions of utilitarianism that respond to one
or more of these objections. Moving and transaction costs can be easily addressed
by incorporating these costs into the household’s utility maximization problem.
Others have proposed modified versions of utilitarianism that weight utility
functions to emphasize egalitarian objectives. Prioritarianism is one alternative to
utilitarianism that gives precedence to the concerns of those with the greatest needs.
According to this perspective, those who enjoy the least utility should receive the
highest weight in the utility maximization calculus (Arneson 2000). Another reason
to employ an appropriately weighted aggregate utility function is that housing is a
positional good, which implies that its relative value is at least as important as its
absolute value. Due to the positionality of housing, households often overconsume
housing to signal social status and “keep up with the Joneses” (Dawkins 2017;
Dawkins 2021).
Not all objections to utilitarianism can be addressed through better cost
accounting and utility weights. If equality, a comparative and relational ideal, has
intrinsic value, this value will be ignored by any perspective that understands value
in terms of the aggregation of consequences. For example, Ronald Dworkin (1977)
objects to utilitarianism because it considers individuals’ “external preferences”
over others’ access to society’s resources. John Rawls (1971) makes a similar
argument, objecting to utilitarianism because it considers “offensive tastes” for
discrimination against others. If people of color face constrained housing options
due to white households’ aversion to living in racially integrated neighborhoods,
the standard utilitarian framework offers no objection this injustice unless it reduces
the sum of aggregate utility. The remaining perspectives depart from utilitarianism
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to address more fundamental questions about choice that are not easily addressed
within the utilitarian framework.
Expanding the Diversity of Choice
Smart growth policy guides often refer to the goal of expanding the diversity
of housing choice. For example, the Ahwahnee Principles, which many credit for
catalyzing the smart growth movement in the early 1990s, assert, “A community
should contain a diversity of housing types to enable citizens from a wide range of
economic levels and age groups to live within its boundaries” (Local Government
Commission 1991). In terms of the monocentric model of housing choice,
diversification of housing choice is equivalent to maximizing the diversity of
observable housing attributes (z) across the spectrum of housing options that
housing consumers face.
Value pluralism provides one argument in support of housing choice
diversification. According to Isaiah Berlin (1971, 169), “the ends of men are many,
and not all of them are in principle compatible with each other.” Individuals and
families seek housing for a variety of different reasons, including comfort, privacy,
safety, aesthetics, and social affiliation. For many, housing not only produces these
and other beneficial consequences, but it also provides a platform for the cultivation
of life plans that are grounded in a comprehensive conception of the good life.
Furthermore, American households come from a variety of different social and
economic backgrounds, cultures, and religious traditions that value the home in
different ways. The physical heterogeneity of the housing stock increases the
likelihood that each house will be valued differently by those who seek to inhabit
it. These facts suggest that it is difficult and often impossible to compare the
benefits that one household receives from living in a given home with the benefits
that another household would receive from living in the same home. Standard
utilitarian models of household choice, which require utility functions to be of a
form that can be aggregated across and compared between households, fall apart in
the face of extreme value pluralism. The pluralism, heterogeneity, and
incommensurability of housing’s value provides a reason to promote the diversity
of housing’s observable attributes, as reflected in the elements of z, to increase the
likelihood that households exhibiting diverse preferences will find suitable housing
units.
There are a few problems with this perspective. First, the strength of this
argument hinges on the truth of the value pluralism claim. Although it is not very
difficult to demonstrate that preferences for housing are diverse and that housing is
heterogeneous with respect to its attributes, there is no reason to accept the stronger
claim that all of the benefits of being housed are irreducibly incommensurable.
Preferences for at least some of housing’s attributes, such as its space or physical
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quality, are shared more widely than the incommensurability claim would suggest,
and most everyone recognizes the value of having some place to call home.
Policies designed to maximize housing diversity may also have implications
that some housing diversity advocates may not accept. For example, in an urban
community where large-lot, single-family dwellings are scarce, the goal of
maximizing housing diversity justifies the downzoning of urban land, even if high
land costs preclude the construction of low-density housing units. A policy of
maximizing housing diversity is also consistent with the promotion of urban-scale
development within rural areas not served by infrastructure, a goal that flies in the
face of smart growth advocates’ compact growth policy objectives.
The Ahwahnee Principle of promoting a “diversity of housing types to
enable citizens from a wide range of economic levels and age groups to live within
its boundaries” (Local Government Commission 1991) may also encourage
questionable housing policy priorities. When planners apply the housing diversity
goal to prices and affordability levels, diversity enhancement may take priority over
the goal of housing those facing the most severe housing needs. For example,
policies that seek to diversify the housing stock through the promotion of
“workforce housing” and “missing-middle” housing for moderate-income
households may reduce the resources available and attention given to the housing
needs of the unemployed and those earning incomes below the poverty line.
Another reason to promote housing diversity is that diverse housing is an
instrumental means of creating neighborhoods that are integrated by socioeconomic
class. If spatial proximity breeds social propinquity, residential integration may
help to build social capital among those from different socioeconomic
backgrounds. Higher levels of social capital may, in turn, help to disseminate
information about economic opportunities and help to foster the social solidarity
needed for a healthy democracy (Anderson 2010). Justifying the diversification of
housing choice on the basis of diversity’s connection to residential integration has
implications for the geographic scale at which to promote housing diversity.
Housing that is diverse citywide may still be segregated at the scale of individual
neighborhoods, which implies that housing diversity is best promoted at the local
level (Dawkins and Kim forthcoming).
The integrationist argument for housing diversity is limited by its appeal to
a number of questionable empirical claims. A diversity of housing types does not
necessarily equate to population diversity. Emily Talen (2010) examines a large
sample of new urbanist housing developments that promote diversity through
design. She finds that housing is affordable to those earning the area median income
or less in fewer than one-quarter of the developments examined. Even if residential
developments with a diversity of housing types successfully foster mixed-income
settlement patterns, there is nothing about living in proximity that guarantees
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meaningful social interaction across socioeconomic class. New mixed housing type
communities also often displace incumbent low-income residents and destroy the
social fabric of existing communities (Chapple and Goetz 2011).
Prioritizing Particular Choices
Justifications for housing policies often appeal to an idealized conception
of what constitutes a worthwhile and flourishing way of living to justify the
promotion of particular housing choices that are consistent with that ideal.
Throughout American history, homeownership policies have been justified by
appealing to claims that homeowners are better citizens or that suburban lifestyles
are superior (Dawkins 2021). For example, Herbert Hoover, in his 1931 address to
those attending his President’s Conference on Home Building and Home
Ownership, asserted that homeownership makes for “happier married life” and
“better citizenship” (Zundell, 2000, 44-45). New urbanists and smart growth
advocates have offered similar arguments to justify compact living arrangements
and traditional neighborhood designs.
Policy justifications of this sort often appeal to a perfectionist morality,
which Steven Wall (1998) defines as any moral framework that is committed to the
promotion of an ideal of human flourishing, the good life, or human excellence.
Although perfectionist frameworks abound in housing and urban policy circles,
policies justified by appeals to controversial ideals of human flourishing fail to
respect those who do not organize their lives in accordance with those ideals, even
if the ideal of human flourishing is a sound one. If some version of value pluralism
is true, it is even more likely that any given ideal of how life should be lived will
not be shared by everyone. Perfectionist justifications for policy intervention may
also be objectionably paternalistic and manipulative, violating the liberal “harm
principle” which states that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others” (Mill 1978 [1859], 9). As Jeremy Waldron puts it, “messing with
the options” that someone faces by altering the availability and payoffs of different
choices “treats the agent as someone incapable of making independent moral
decisions on the merits of the case” (Waldron 1989, 1145-1146).
Choice Neutrality
In direct contrast to the perfectionist view that public policies should be
designed to promote particular choices to nudge households towards an ideal of
human excellence, liberal theorists such as John Rawls (1971; 1993) argue that the
government should maintain a stance of neutrality and refrain from actions that are
justified by appeals to controversial ideals of how life should be lived. According
to this view, the government’s proper role is a noninterventionist one defined by
minimal constraints on the exercise of individual choices. This argument is
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consistent with the value pluralism thesis without having to commit to the veracity
of a potentially unverifiable view about the nature of value. According to
neutralists, there are many different reasonable conceptions of the good life, and
governments should not weigh in on which of these conceptions is correct. The
proper role of government is to create an environment that enables the
unconstrained pursuit of a variety of life paths.
Although the liberal neutrality framework is essentially a noninterventionist
view, liberal egalitarians such as John Rawls still find room for a government role
in the redistribution of economic resources. For Rawls (1971), free and equal
individuals would rationally consent to an institutional arrangement that distributes
society’s “primary goods” to maximize advantages for those who are least
advantaged. The neutralist perspective also provides a justification for radical
policy reforms that would have the effect of diversifying housing choices within
most U.S. communities. Traditional U.S. zoning ordinances tend to prioritize the
proliferation and preservation of single-family detached homes on large lots (Hirt
2014). For the neutralist, this form of regulation is objectionable if it unfairly
privileges a single housing type by appealing to a controversial claim about that
housing type’s connection to the good life. The elimination of single-use zoning
would help to ensure that land-use policies do not stifle housing diversity by
unfairly privileging one housing type over another. As discussed later in this paper,
the neutrality framework provides a justification for radical housing and land-use
policy reforms that would fundamentally reshape the housing options facing U.S.
housing consumers.
Expanding the Capacity for Choice
One limitation of the views discussed so far is that none, with the possible
exception of Rawls’s (1971; 1993) liberal egalitarian framework, explicitly address
the capacity of households to exercise housing choice. Returning to the housing
choice model described in the previous section, increases in income and reductions
in housing prices expand the capacity of households to actually rent or purchase the
homes that they prefer. Home seekers also require adequate information about
housing options, technical expertise to assess the quality and condition of homes,
and time to evaluate alternatives. Furthermore, housing consumers of color often
face discrimination in the housing market, which closes off certain housing options
made available to others. A full consideration of the capacity for choice elevates
the importance of effective choice, which Tim Brown and Peter King (2005, 68)
define as “the opportunities for self-creation and the ability to affect the context
(i.e. one’s current situation) itself, and, second, the access to resources that
translates choice into empowerment.”
Martha Nussbaum (2000) and Amartya Sen (1985) offer a useful framework
that incorporates an emphasis on the capacity to exercise choice. Their “capabilities
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approach” departs from utilitarianism by appealing to the idea that what matters,
from a social policy perspective, is not the utility conveyed from the consumption
of goods but the ability of households to use goods to do and be something.
According to this view, housing is important because it enables households to be
sheltered, raise a family, or build social connections. As Nussbaum argues,
. . . giving resources to people does not always bring differently situated
people up to the same level of capability to function. The utility-based
analysis also encounters a problem: traditionally deprived people may be
satisfied with a very low living standard, believing that this is all they have
any hope of getting. A capabilities analysis, by contrast, looks at how people
are actually enabled to live. Analyzing economic and material rights in
terms of capabilities thus enables U.S. to set forth clearly a rationale we
have for spending unequal amounts of money on the disadvantaged, or
creating special programs to assist their transition to full capability.
(Nussbaum 2000, 99)
Because the capabilities approach prioritizes the elevation of everyone to a
minimally acceptable level of capability to function, the capabilities approach can
be understood as a sufficientarian understanding of effective choice. Harry
Frankfurt describes sufficientarianism as follows: “With respect to the distribution
of economic assets, what is important from the point of view of morality is not that
everyone should have the same but that each should have enough. If everyone had
enough, it would be of no moral consequence whether some had more than others.
I shall refer to this alternative to egalitarianism—namely, that what is morally
important with respect to money is for everyone to have enough—as ‘the doctrine
of sufficiency’” (Frankfurt 1987, 21–22). Nussbaum (2006) appeals to this idea to
argue that “an adequate house or other shelter seems to be inherent in the idea of
human dignity,” but “it is not at all clear that an equal house is required by the very
idea of human dignity or even of equal human dignity; for indeed a mansion may
not be better than a modest house. House size, above a certain threshold, does not
seem intrinsically related to equal dignity” (Nussbaum 2006, 293). Karen Chapple
and Edward Goetz (2011) draw upon this idea to object to the “equity regionalist”
housing choice perspective that tends to downplay the significance of the social
contexts affecting housing choice while elevating the choice to move over the
choice to stay.
Neutralizing Unlucky Choices
The luck egalitarian perspective offers a slightly different way of
understanding effective choice. For luck egalitarians such as Ronald Dworkin
(2000), Richard Arneson (1989), and G. A. Cohen (1989), the proper role of
government is to equalize opportunities for choice by eliminating undeserved
constraints on the exercise of choice, such as those arising from bad luck, inherited
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disadvantages, or social class. The role of housing policy, according to the luck
egalitarian framework, is to redistribute society’s resources to compensate
individuals for the unequal housing opportunities that can be traced to differences
in unchosen circumstances, while ignoring inequalities that result from
unconstrained free choice.
The luck egalitarian perspective provides a framework for integrating fair
housing policy objectives into a broader housing policy framework. If someone
faces a limited range of housing options due to housing market discrimination on
the basis of race or ethnicity, the luck egalitarian view provides a justification for
policies such as the Fair Housing Act (1968) that seek to eliminate the racial and
ethnic gaps in housing options. Furthermore, the luck egalitarian perspective
provides a rationale for equalizing geographic opportunities by neutralizing the
disadvantages that arise from being born in a location that provides limited
opportunities for economic and social advancement (Dawkins 2017).
As a basis for understanding housing choice, the luck egalitarian
perspective has certain limitations. Luck egalitarians tend to be more concerned
with identifying the proper scope of responsibility than with expanding the capacity
for choice among those who face limited options (Anderson 1999). In contrast to
capability theorists, luck egalitarians would find no fault with some losing their
homes, if the choice of being homeless could be shown to be attributable to factors
within the control of the person rendered homeless. Furthermore, it is hard to argue,
as some luck egalitarians do, that someone should be held responsible for choices
made in accordance with the “adaptive preferences” that were formed in response
to an oppressive social environment (Sunstein 1991).
Beyond Choice
For many affordable housing advocates, housing satisfies the basic human
need to be protected from harmful environmental conditions, and the urgency of
this need justifies governmental provision of a minimally adequate home to
everyone. There are two elements of this perspective. First, the urgency of human
needs implies that choice should play a less significant role in housing’s allocation,
because no one should have to face the choice between being housed or not being
housed (or being housed while forgoing access to other important needs) (King
2003). Second, the distribution of housing and its attributes is less important than
providing adequate shelter to each and every person.
According to this view, choice-based perspectives are inadequate because
they assume that housing should be allocated through markets. David Madden and
Peter Marcuse (2016, 56) appeal to Karl Marx to argue that the commodification of
housing through the elevation of its exchange value relative to its use value fosters
residential alienation, and this estrangement from one’s residential environment is
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a precondition for all forms of private property. Madden and Marcuse’s (2016)
proposed solution to residential alienation is the full decommodification of housing
through government provision of housing.
This view asks too much from the concept of need. Although housing
satisfies an important need, the need for shelter is a contingent fact that varies by
climactic conditions. In most temperate climates, something recognizable as a
home is not necessarily required to protect someone from harmful environmental
conditions. A lean-to or a tent may provide sufficient protection from
environmental threats in the absence of extreme weather events. The housing needs
perspective also tends to focus too narrowly on biological needs while ignoring the
higher-order needs of psychological fulfillment and self-actualization that are met
through active participation in the decisions that shape one’s path in life (Dawkins
2021).
The commodification of housing and conversion of residential space into a
tradeable market good may or may not foster residential alienation. If individuals
acquire homes that embody their ideals of a well-lived life and enjoy the freedom
to personalize homes in accordance with their tastes and preferences, these choices
may help to secure a meaningful attachment to place, even if the home was acquired
through a market-based transaction (Dawkins 2021). Furthermore, the exercise of
choice gives meaning to the choices made, because the homes selected through
choice have positional value relative to the housing options that were rejected. If
housing is allocated through a command-and-control allocation mechanism that
eliminates choice through the full decommodification of housing, these meaningful
attachments to chosen homes will be lost.
HOUSING CHOICE REVISITED
As illustrated in the previous section, the aim of expanding housing choice
can mean different things to different people, and these differences can often be
traced to divergent views about the moral significance of housing choices. In this
section, I defend a hybrid normative framework that combines elements of the
effective choice and neutrality perspectives. I argue that when it comes to housing
choice, housing policy advocates should first prioritize the enhancement of
effective choice for those who face the most severe housing needs, and secondly,
promote tenure and type neutrality. This dual emphasis provides a moral framework
that is consistent with a wide variety of housing policy reforms.
Homelessness and housing insecurity are arguably the most significant
moral concerns facing housing policymakers. Regardless of one’s conception of the
good life, it is hard to live a life in accordance with that conception in American
society without access to a home and the security that comes from knowing that a
home will be available for an extended time. Homes secure important social bases
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of self-respect, and access to a home is a precondition for accessing many of the
rights and benefits of American citizenship. For example, the right to privacy is
meaningless for those who have no place in which to exercise privacy. Public
education and many other important local public goods and services are provided
only to those who can verify local residency. Importantly, those without homes are
often socially stigmatized and face the threat of cruel and unusual punishment due
to laws that criminalize sleeping in public (Dawkins 2021). At a minimum, housing
policy should guarantee that everyone has an acceptable number of housing
options, regardless of their socioeconomic status.
One simple way to implement this ideal in practice is to substantially
expand the coverage of the tenant-based Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) subsidy
while converting it to a cash subsidy or refundable tax credit, as Senator Cory
Booker proposed during his bid to become the Democratic Party’s presidential
nominee during the 2020 campaign season. Converting the HCV to a cash subsidy
would eliminate the potential for source-of-income discrimination, a problem that
currently plagues the HCV program. Expanding HCV coverage to provide a
monthly subsidy, at the current average HCV payment of $834, to all who are
currently homeless (567,715, based on the most recent count by Henry et al. (2020))
or experience “worst-case” housing needs (7,716,000 households according to
Watson et al. (2020)) would cost roughly $82.9 billion annually. By comparison,
HUD currently spends $18.8 billion for its tenant-based subsidy programs (US
Department of Housing and Urban Development 2020). This funding amount
seems substantial, but $82.9 billion is still substantially less than the approximately
$209 billion in forgone income tax revenue awarded to homeowners for the
mortgage interest deduction, state and local property tax deduction, home sale
capital gains tax deduction, and exclusion of imputed rental income (Office of
Management and Budget 2019).
Reforming income tax policy to redirect a portion of homeownership tax
expenditures to a guaranteed housing subsidy would expand effective housing
choice for those facing the most severe housing needs while also improving tenure
neutrality. Current income tax policy treats homeowners and renters unequally by
rewarding those with mortgages who live rent-free in the homes that they own. As
described in more detail in Dawkins (2021), tenure neutrality also provides a
justification for a variety of property-based reforms that put renters on more equal
footing with homeowners in terms of the advantages conveyed through housing
occupancy. Even if income tax policy is fully neutralized with respect to tenure,
homeowners still enjoy more secure residential tenure arrangements than renters
because landlords define the terms of rental contracts, retain the right to enter into
rental homes unannounced, and in most states, may raise rents upon lease renewal
or evict tenants for trivial causes. Policies such as just-cause anti-eviction statutes,
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implied warranties of habitability, and rent controls help to elevate renters’ tenure
security to a level more comparable to that enjoyed by homeowners. Laws that
enable and encourage hybrid tenure arrangements also enhance tenure security and
expand effective housing choice. For example, limited equity cooperatives convert
tenants to shareholders through the creation of a durable right of occupancy that
includes the rights to exchange and alienate ownership shares upon residential
mobility. Similarly, shared-equity homeownership opportunities and community
land trusts allow homeowners to forgo the ability to earn housing equity or the right
to own the land underneath homes in exchange for a durable right of occupancy
(Dawkins 2021). Tenure neutrality, when viewed in conjunction with a
commitment to expanding effective choice, levels the playing field between
homeowners and renters while expanding durable and secure housing opportunities
for everyone.
The ideal of neutrality also provides a justification for radical reforms of
local land-use practices. Given that most zoning policies unfairly privilege the
owned single-family detached home, neutrality justifies reforms that would enable
a wide range of undersupplied affordable housing types, including multifamily
housing, accessory dwelling units, tiny homes, and manufactured housing.
Furthermore, a focus on the expansion of effective choice reminds housing
policymakers to prioritize the choices of those facing the greatest housing needs
over the choices of moderate-income households seeking workforce housing.
The 2019 housing policies adopted in the state of Oregon provide examples
of the types of reforms that are consistent with a combined emphasis on effective
choice and neutrality. Oregon Senate Bill 608 restricts yearly rent increases to 7
percent and provides just-cause protections against evictions. House Bill 2001
requires cities with a population of 10,000 or more to allow duplexes in singlefamily zones. The city of Portland, Oregon, is going one step beyond the state
mandate by revising its zoning ordinance to allow duplexes and triplexes in singlefamily zones (Axel-Lute 2019). The Oregon case provides lessons to housing
movements in other states that are mired in tensions between supply-side zoning
reform proponents and tenants’ rights advocates. An emphasis on expanded
capacity for effective choice, when combined with a neutral approach to the
regulation and taxation of tenures and types, provides a large tent under which
many housing advocates can find shelter.
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CONCLUSION
As this paper has demonstrated, housing choice is a contested concept.
Housing and land-use policy experts appeal to a variety of different moral
arguments to justify the maximization of benefits from choice, diversification of
housing choice, prioritization of particular choices, neutral attitudes about choice,
and expansion of effective choice. Others deny the importance of housing choice.
This paper analyzed the normative foundations of these different perspectives and
proposed a hybrid framework that incorporates elements of the effective choice and
neutralist perspective. To expand effective choice, I proposed redistributing current
homeownership tax expenditures to an expanded housing subsidy targeted to those
facing the most severe housing needs. I also demonstrated how tenure neutrality
provides a justification for a variety of property-based reforms that place renters
and owners on more equal footing. The principle of housing type neutrality
complements these reforms by providing a justification for a wide variety of local
land-use reforms that enable the production of multifamily housing, accessory
dwelling units, tiny homes, and manufactured housing.
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